Crush the Cell

Michael Sheehan served tours of duty in Panama and El Salvador. He worked in the U.S. government and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Throughout his career, he fought on the frontlines of the war on terror. Just don’t tell him that’s what it is.

“I don’t consider it a war,” said Sheehan. “It’s counter-terrorism.”

Sheehan, former NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Counter-Terrorism, argues that a war isn’t going to suppress terrorist cells linked to al Qaeda. The strategic intelligence and counter-terrorism efforts can accomplish U.S. goals.

Sheehan is the author of the new book Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves. At the Heritage Foundation he outlined his analysis of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts before and after September 11, 2001. Sheehan seeks “a rationale dialogue about terrorism and counter-terrorism, without the politics involved.”

Prior to 9/11, officials did not view al Qaeda as a terrorist threat. Sheehan cites the suicide bombings of multiple U.S. embassies in East Africa in August 1998 and of the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000 as two major attacks that should have triggered U.S. interest in al Qaeda.

He points to the third presidential debate leading up to the 2000 election between nominees Al Gore and George W. Bush as a barometer for the nation’s interest in the attacks; the USS Cole had been struck only five days prior to the debate.

Still, conversations at the debate were bereft of any mention of al Qaeda.

“They had questions about terrorism and questions about the Middle East and none of them mentioned al Qaeda, none of them mentioned the Cole,” said Sheehan. “They had questions from the audience and questions from the media and no one mentioned the Cole. They had a pre-prepared opening speech and pre-prepared ending speech and none of them mentioned the Cole.”

It took a direct attack on U.S. soil for the nation and government to respond.

During the 9/11 attacks Sheehan served as coordinator for counter-terrorism at the State Department. In a mid-September 2001 PBS Frontline interview, he noted his shock at the attack.

“We didn’t expect an organization to have such ties within the continental United States, to have such cells operating,” said Sheehan. “Something like the embassies, or the USS Cole, or even something worse than that—we were expecting that.”

Sheehan argues their response was in many ways an equal misstep to their limited knowledge of al Qaeda.

“It’s my contention that prior to 9/11 we grossly underestimated the capability of al Qaeda,” said Sheehan. “And after 9/11, we grossly overestimated their capability.”

Sheehan said only 1½ attacks qualify as major terrorist actions operated by al Qaeda in the West; the London subway bombing in July 2005 and the Madrid train bombings in March 2004.

He counts Madrid as the half since al Qaeda has not been directly linked to the attack. However, Spanish officials announced an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell was responsible.

“Suicide terrorism is a rare, rare event,” said Sheehan. “If we don’t overreact, that’s all it is.”

While serving at the NYPD, two of Sheehan’s officers visiting Israeli police forces witnessed a suicide bombing at a mall that killed two people. Within hours, the Israelis had cleaned the bomb zone and reopened the coffee shop—the direct site of the explosion—to customers.

“Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, like Hamas and Hezbollah, attack innocent civilians because they’re inherently weak,” said Sheehan. “They’re trying to attack you psychologically. They only can be successful if you react psychologically and overreact to the attack.”

Sheehan said the U.S. overreacted following 9/11. While he applauds military action such as efforts in October 2001 to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, he said that increased spending in counter-terrorism operations was unnecessary.

Sheehan also disregards defensive strategies designed to protect the U.S. from attack. He said strong offensive strategies—such as infiltrating sleeper cells to disrupt the top-to-bottom chain of command of terrorist organization—are the best way to prevent terrorists from functioning effectively.

“What happens after 9/11 is we switch on against al Qaeda,” said Sheehan, “with the CIA overseas, with the FBI domestically, with groups like NYPD that turned on the switch and knock them back with great effectiveness.”

According to Sheehan, this explains why there have been no attacks on U.S. soil since 2001.

“They can no longer export like they used to and connect to the local cells,” said Sheehan.

Sheehan said he is “certain” that the U.S. will be attacked again. However, he urged the U.S. to learn from the Israelis and be similarly stoic in its reaction to future attacks.

“Do not give them anything beyond the bursting radius of that attack,” said Sheehan.

Most of all, Sheehan stressed that his concept of counter-terrorism is non-political. The most effective way to combat terrorism is to remain rational and keep politics on the sidelines.

If the U.S. is successful in that regard, Sheehan claims that terrorist organizations will be rendered ineffective. So far, they’ve accomplished that.

“The central apparatus in al Qaeda can’t get here, and the local apparatus lack the leadership, the logistics, and that final operational push,” said Sheehan. “If they get those things together they will attack us, and they will attack us tomorrow. That I can assure you of. But right now, under pressure, they’re having difficulty.”

Ben Giles is an intern at the American Journalism Center, a training program run by Accuracy in Media and Accuracy in Academia.