Indefensible Deterrent

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The policy of deterrence needs to be eliminated as the guiding interest in American defense policy, says Dr. Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy.

Deterrence theory has been the guiding hand in U.S. defense policy since the start of the Cold War. Dr. Payne discussed the shortcomings of this theory at a July 28th Heritage Foundation lecture. “We know that the fear of escalation on occasion does not deter,” says Payne, “We have favored a theory truly built on fallacies.”

Dr. Payne’s new book, The Great American Gamble, uses recently declassified government documents to examine the role that deterrence theory has played and continues to play in U.S. defense policy and to prove that it has ultimately been an ineffective strategy.

“There are several instances where deterrence is proven to have failed. Look at Saddam’s missile attack on Israel’s nuclear facilities. His goal was not to shut down Israel’s nuclear capabilities, but rather to deliberately provoke a nuclear response from Israel,” said Payne.

Payne also discussed some of the assumptions on which the theory of deterrence is based which are problematic. Perhaps the foremost among those mentioned was that deterrence depends on the chain of command always holding and does not allow for any miscommunications.

The example that Payne detailed in discussing this particular point was the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. In this case, the local Soviet commander was given emergency launch authority by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. That authority was rescinded shortly thereafter, but the local commander later testified that he had not been aware that he no longer possessed emergency launch authority. With the Soviets under tremendous pressure from Cuban leaders Che Guevara and Fidel Castro to launch at the United States and the chain of command broken, this presented a vastly more dangerous situation than many people ever realized.

Another key component of the theory of deterrence that Payne cited as being somewhat problematic is that it depended on both nations maintaining a degree of vulnerability. If one nation pushed ahead of the other with respect to missile defense technology, the “balance of terror” that needs to be maintained in the theory of deterrence is suddenly upset.

This tenet of the theory led U.S. officials to reject significant upgrades in U.S. defense capabilities in order to adhere to deterrence theory. U.S. officials believed that the cost of maintaining a defensive posture was too great, estimating the cost disparity to be in the neighborhood of 3:1.

To further buttress his argument Dr. Payne cited the twisted logic involved in the decision-making process regarding deterrence. “Secretary (Robert) McNamara decided to eliminate 22 air defense squadrons because total U.S. [potential] casualties from a Soviet attack would be only five million higher with the squadrons out of service,” said Payne.

With the outcry over actual casualties in Iraq, which are 1,000 fold fewer in number, this type of defense policy just doesn’t seem to fit. It has become crystal clear that if America’s defense policy is truly still centered on a policy that is a relic of the Cold War, it is time for U.S. defense officials to reshape U.S. strategy.

Jeff Waldmann is an intern at the American Journalism Center, a training program run by Accuracy in Media and Accuracy in Academia.