Seven years ago the United States military entered Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Now this once straightforward mission is becoming increasingly complex as politicians continue to tack on non-military objectives. “The military had initially resisted other attempts to broaden its mission in Afghanistan, and yet ended up adopting those expanded roles within months,” stated Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter. “For example, the military command insisted that it would not take part in nation-building activities and would not try to maintain security on the country’s far-flung road system. It has since embarked on both projects.”
Currently, politicians continue to urge the U.S. military to adopt additional objectives in Afghanistan; however, one of these congressional impulses could undermine the military’s original and primary objective in the region. As stated by Dr. Carpenter, vice-president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute:
“Congressional pressure is mounting . . . to make counternarcotics goals a significant part of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan . . . The most important objective is—or at least should be—the eradication of the remaining Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in that country. But the United States and its coalition partners are now also emphasizing the eradication of Afghanistan’s drug trade. These anti-drug efforts may fatally undermine the far more important anti-terrorism campaign.”
Dr. Carpenter, quoting from his new publication, How the Drug War in Afghanistan Undermines America’s War on Terror, during a recent Cato Institute Capital Hill Briefing, explained:
“The drug trade is a central feature of Afghanistan’s economy . . . The International Monetary Fund calculates that the drug trade makes up at least 40 percent and perhaps as much as 60 percent of the country’s entire GDP . . . Some 264,000 families are estimated to be involved in growing opium poppies. Even measured on the basis of nuclear family, that translates into roughly 1.7 million people—about six percent of Afghanistan’s population. Given the role of extended families and clans in Afghan society, the number of people affected is much greater than that. Indeed, it is likely that 20 to 30 percent of the population is involved directly or indirectly in the drug trade. For many of those people, opium poppy crops and other aspects of drug commerce are the difference between modest prosperity and destitution. They will not look kindly on efforts to destroy their livelihood.”
The United States military must enlist the help of Afghan locals in order to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban, he argues. “We need the warlords and the general population to gather intelligence and for military assistance. Without them we will not win the war in Afghanistan,” asserted Dr. Carpenter.
“It is all well and good them [politicians] saying they want to do that [eliminate the drug trade in Afghanistan] to save junkies in America from killing themselves,” stated Dr. Carpenter, quoting an unnamed Western official, “But try telling that to an Afghan farmer. Try telling him that Washington wants to destroy his crop—which provides for his family—because they want to save the lives of American junkies.” By turning the military into “glorified narcotics cops,” politicians are undermining the primary military objective in Afghanistan, he argues.
Many politicians, however, believe that the United States could implement a crop substitution plan, giving Afghan farmers an incentive to grow legal crops and helping to end the drug trade. Although, Dr. Carpenter argued, “Economic realities doom crop substitution schemes . . .”
“Afghan farmers can typically make between ten and 30 times as much growing opium poppies as they can any legal crop. The prohibitionist policy that the United States and other drug-consuming countries continue to pursue guarantees a huge black market premium for all illegal drugs. Drug traffickers can pay whatever price is necessary to get farmers to cultivate drug crops and still enjoy an enormous profit for their portion of the supply pipeline. Legal crops simply cannot compete financially.”
The United States did not enter Afghanistan to stop the cultivation of poppies. The United States entered Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban. As Dr. Carpenter stated, “The war on radical Islamic terrorism must take priority.”
Lance Nation is an intern at the American Journalism Center, a training program run by Accuracy in Media and Accuracy in Academia.
