Forgotten War Gets Longer

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Military campaigns in Afghanistan have a very poor record, historically. President Obama is seeking to change that, however, by developing a strategy in Afghanistan that will lead to government stability and legitimacy, and another ally for the U.S. in the Middle East. The Center for American Progress (CAP) weighed in recently on the situation in Afghanistan in a report entitled “Swords and Ploughshares,” which can be found online.

CAP’s suggestions stem from a series of innovative scenarios, within which a group of experts on Afghanistan and regional development discussed the U.S.’s best options. The simulation was meant to assess the situation from both sides—with a view from U.S. domestic policymaking and from military and civil workers on the ground in Afghanistan—and was to apply elements of defense, diplomacy and development.

One of our most daunting challenges in Afghanistan, according to CAP’s analysis, is to improve our ability to encourage development. “The ability of the U.S. government to improve the lives of others in countries with varying degrees of instability does not match its ability to wage decisive combat operations,” reads Swords to Ploughshares. It points out that this disparity represents a “fundamental mismatch between the civilian and military aspects of American power…”

The simulation addressed the concern for infrastructure development by seeking to tackle the issues that stand in its way. The participants in the simulation placed development fifth on a list of priorities because they knew that “development programs could not be successful unless the other four priorities, especially security, were either achieved or well underway.”

• The priorities that would necessarily precede development included:

• The need for a political breakthrough; adopting a regional approach for all issues; Advancing security; and

• Strengthening governance and the rule of law.

The group also identified efforts to advance the legitimacy of the Afghan government as paramount. With influxes of U.S. troops, chronic instability, and elections taking place in Afghanistan, can the government achieve and maintain legitimacy?

However, explained Patrick Cronin of the National Defense University, “Development is not just one of the elements, it’s a package deal. If we’re going to have some hope of it being more successful, then you’re going to need to resolve all of these challenges.” Though encouraging development is the ultimate goal in Afghanistan right now, it may be out of reach in the short term, as a winning strategy that puts Afghans in charge is formulated.

“Some say that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires,” said Cronin. “But I’m not disheartened by that because the United States does not aspire to be an empire and is not an empire. If you’re trying to build the capacity of the Afghans, then you may be able to achieve success. If you’re trying to run Afghanistan, then you are destined to fail.”

Simulations can project only so far and with moderate accuracy the challenges that the U.S. will face in its Afghanistan campaign. The complexities of this war are unique, and will require more than talk to overcome. In a recent interview, General David Petraeus discussed some of the new challenges this war is presenting, and why it may not even be possible to simulate or predict what we will confront. He explained, “While general concepts that proved important in Iraq may be applicable in Afghanistan…the application of those big ideas has to be adapted to Afghanistan. The ‘operationalization’ will inevitably be different, as Afghanistan has a very different history and very different ‘muscle memory’…”

Petraeus’ comments agreed with CAP’s analysis on the need for an increase in development and support operations. The Army must be engaged in “full spectrum operations,” he said. “This concept holds that all military operations are some mix of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations.”

The interviewer reminded General Petraeus of a report to Secretary Rumsfeld that he made in 2005 in which he said that this could be the longest part of the war. Petraues’ response: “I didn’t say it could be. I said it would be.” The war effort in Afghanistan will require dedicated, comprehensive action. Perhaps more importantly, and more difficult to achieve, this war will require a sustained commitment if we plan to see it through to victory.

Daniel Allen is an intern at the American Journalism Center, a training program run by Accuracy in Media and Accuracy in Academia.