David Edelstein argues for one major variable of success for military occupancy, and his research shows that the War in Iraq has done a poor job of recognizing this all-important factor.
Edelstein, an assistant professor at Georgetown University, presented the findings of his new book, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure In Military Occupancy, at the Cato Institute on May 29, a subject which moderator Justin Long called a “terribly important topic, and terribly timely as well.”
“If only we had had this book before the invasion of Iraq,” said Jack Snyder of Columbia University, in comments on the newly released book.
Edelstein’s research isolated the threat level faced by the occupied country as the most important factor leading to the success or failure of the occupation.
“The key to a successful operation, historically, is the presence of an external threat from which the occupying power can protect the population,” said Edelstein, “and which motivates the occupying power to continue to provide those resources and sustain the commitment through the occupation.”
Without that threat, Edelstein finds that occupancy tends to fail. Out of 26 completed and four ongoing cases studied since 1815, only about 25 percent succeeded.
With one exception—the occupation of Napoleonic France in 1815—all instances of successful military occupation occurred following World War II.
Edelstein argued that the threat of communism from the U.S.S.R. inclined countries like Germany and Japan to accept occupation by the United States. Without such an intense outward threat, dissatisfaction with occupation settles among the occupied country.
“Nationalism—their desire to govern themselves—leads them to quickly grow impatient with military population,” said Edelstein.
The outward threat is also important to the occupying power. If the citizens of that nation do not recognize the importance of the occupation and support it, political unrest can undermine the occupation.
While a proper amount of time and resources are needed to successfully complete the occupation, these are precisely the factors that citizens of the occupying power are less willing to surrender.
“The population of the occupying power starts to question whether the occupation is worth the resources that they’re devoting to it,” said Edelstein.
Edelstein found that comparisons between post-war Iraq in 2003 and post-WWII Germany and Japan were unfair.
“Germany and Japan are in fact the exceptions rather than the rules when it comes to the history of military occupation,” said Edelstein.
Occupations tend to fail when the occupied nation does not feel a grave external threat, when the threat comes from within the occupied nation, or when the occupation simply takes too much time to completely succeed.
Edelstein concludes his book with a chapter outlining the application of his research to Iraq.
“Not surprisingly, I find that what has happened in Iraq since 2003 is largely consistent with the argument I’ve laid out,” said Edelstein.
Edelstein argues that the occupation faced an unfavorable threat coming from within Iraq, and neither the occupying force nor occupied population could rally behind the threat. Also, a divided Iraqi population could further complicate the nationalist feelings of occupied Iraq.
“The problem of occupation is far more a political problem than it is a simple security problem,” said Edelstein.
While some have cited the surge in troops for the stabilization of Iraq’s security, Edelstein’s research shows there’s more to be solved.
“We’ve spent a lot of time in the past five years asking about how we can conduct military occupations better,” said Edelstein. “I certainly wouldn’t deny that this is a key question. But I also don’t think that we’ve spent nearly enough time asking whether we should be in this business at all.”
Ben Giles is an intern at the American Journalism Center, a training program run by Accuracy in Media and Accuracy in Academia.
